Will Israel decide Lebanon’s future?

Lebanon’s political paralysis in the face of the ongoing Israeli air and ground attacks has become one of the most striking aspects of the current crisis. While Israeli operations continue to expand, the Lebanese leadership has mostly limited itself to diplomatic condemnations. Even more remarkable is that many Lebanese political figures direct their harshest criticism not at Israel but at Hezbollah itself. Since the foundation of the Lebanese state, structural weaknesses, the paralysis of the political system and especially the deepening sectarian and ethnic fragmentation have gradually eroded state authority. In such a fragmented balance of power, any unified resistance against Israel has remained weak and inconsistent. Still, understanding why Lebanese leaders remain relatively silent toward Israeli attacks while taking a sharp anti-Hezbollah position can help clarify the extremely complicated political reality inside Lebanon.

Dream of disarmament

Over the last year, much of Lebanon’s political class has tied its entire political future to the project of disarming Hezbollah. Rather than producing a coherent policy against Israeli attacks, this approach reflects submission to American pressure and the hope that Washington might somehow restrain Israel in return.

There is a serious paradox in this calculation. Hezbollah is seen as the main problem and many Lebanese politicians believe that removing Hezbollah’s weapons could provide Lebanon with diplomatic leverage against Israel. However, Hezbollah’s existence is also deeply integrated into Lebanese society and even parts of the state structure itself. It is not simply an armed militia but also a social and political movement with a large support base.

At the same time, because of the weakness of the Lebanese army, eliminating Hezbollah would leave Lebanon even more vulnerable militarily. Meanwhile, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continue to pressure Lebanon into taking a harder anti-Hezbollah stance. Lebanese leaders are therefore trying to survive inside an impossible contradiction.

This is why there are many political statements but almost no concrete action. The Lebanese leadership neither has the strength to confront Israel directly nor the real capacity to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. More importantly, there is also little political will for either option. Many Gulf-oriented political elites are mainly focused on preserving themselves and maintaining American support. In this atmosphere, direct negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli representatives took place for the first time in nearly 30 years.

Lebanon today is in an even weaker position than many expected. It has almost no reliable external supporter. If a cease-fire eventually emerges, it would not be surprising to see Lebanese leaders presenting negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a political concession necessary for survival. The Lebanese state also lacks the institutional capacity to manage the growing humanitarian crisis. As the state weakens further, alternative centers of power naturally become more influential, and Hezbollah is one of them. Ironically, the attempt to weaken Hezbollah through external pressure may ultimately strengthen it domestically. The new political and social order emerging under Israeli military pressure could make Hezbollah even stronger relative to the Lebanese state itself.

Dilemma within dilemma

At the same time, Israel’s strategy appears to have expanded far beyond the old “Dahiya Doctrine.” Its current plan reportedly includes occupying nearly 10% of Lebanese territory and displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians. What exists now is no longer simply the targeting of Hezbollah-controlled areas but effectively a broader “Lebanon Doctrine,” where entire regions and multiple actors become legitimate targets. Because of this, the argument that Israel attacks Lebanon only because of Hezbollah’s existence or its ties with Iran has largely collapsed. The Lebanese government’s assumption that Israeli attacks would stop if Hezbollah were weakened is therefore becoming increasingly unsustainable.

At its core, the problem lies in the structural weakness of the Lebanese state itself. These problems cannot realistically be solved in the short or medium term. Not only society but also the political system remains deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. Ironically, both the government that wants to disarm Hezbollah and Hezbollah itself can claim some form of legal or constitutional legitimacy for their positions.

Taking concrete action against Hezbollah could also trigger a sectarian civil war. Taking concrete action against Israel, on the other hand, risks losing American support while also inviting much harsher Israeli attacks. In both scenarios, Lebanon knows that no regional actor is likely to come to its rescue. This is why confronting Hezbollah directly remains almost impossible.

At the same time, cooperating with Hezbollah against Israel is also politically impossible for much of the Lebanese establishment. Even figures who previously adopted a more moderate tone toward Hezbollah have increasingly moved into openly anti-Hezbollah positions, arguing that Hezbollah acts primarily according to Iranian strategic interests rather than Lebanese national interests. These political camps, already unable to unite domestically, are even less likely to support Hezbollah when regional and international balances are taken into account.

Fundamentally, Hezbollah’s armed existence challenges the Lebanese state’s monopoly over force and authority. In a normal state structure, the existence of a powerful non-state armed actor outside the regular army is difficult to accept. This is why anti-Hezbollah sentiment inside Lebanon has a genuine political basis. However, prioritizing hostility toward Hezbollah while Israel expands its occupation in southern Lebanon creates growing public discomfort and contradiction.

In short, the U.S. pressures the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah, while the Trump administration simultaneously treats Lebanon as a secondary issue and largely tolerates ongoing Israeli operations. Lebanon submits to American pressure not only because it is weak but because, structurally, it has no real alternative. Hezbollah, meanwhile, refuses disarmament regardless of the broader regional conflict with Iran, and Lebanon lacks the capability to force such an outcome anyway.

Under Israeli mercy

Inside this chaos, Israel increasingly acts according to realities it creates on the ground rather than waiting for negotiations or diplomatic agreements. At a certain point, what Hezbollah wants, what the Lebanese government does or even what Washington officially plans begins to matter less. Israel is imposing its own political and military equation on Lebanon directly through force.

As a result, the Lebanese government cannot realistically disarm Hezbollah in a way that simultaneously satisfies American pressure and stops Israeli attacks. Yet it also lacks both the will and the strength to adopt an alternative strategy. Measures such as restricting Hezbollah’s military activities or declaring the Iranian ambassador persona non grata have failed to produce the Israeli restraint that some Lebanese politicians hoped for, mainly because such policies are almost impossible to implement fully. The more Washington imposes unrealistic plans on Lebanon, the more these plans collapse. Eventually, Lebanese leaders find themselves accepting Israeli realities on the ground and indirectly adapting to Israeli strategic goals. This is precisely the point Israel relies on, much like in Gaza or during confrontations with Iran.

In the end, any meaningful outcome in Lebanon will depend less on what Hezbollah or the Lebanese government wants and more on how far the U.S. is willing to restrain Israel. At present, no local or regional actor possesses the diplomatic or military capability to stop what Israel is doing in Lebanon.