Economic, social axes: Ottoman, Western diverging perspectives

Ottoman society was built on a fundamentally different axis from Western civilization, which organized its socioeconomic structure around the accumulation of surplus production. The Ottoman economic system was based on a regulation that placed the human being at its center, aimed to meet basic needs securely and equitably, and sought to limit capital accumulation and class stratification as much as possible. The three core principles conceptualized by the late prominent professor Mehmet Genç – provisionism (iaşe), traditionalism (gelenekçilik) and fiscalism (fiskalizm) – play a central role in understanding the distinctive nature of Ottoman society. The principle of provisionism defined the ultimate goal of economic life not as maximizing profit but as ensuring that the needs of the population were met in an affordable and high-quality manner. Within this framework, keeping prices under control, restricting the scale of production centers, and preventing monopolization that could jeopardize the provision of essential goods were considered among the primary duties of the state. This reveals that production was perceived as a public service and that the market was not seen as an autonomous, self-regulating mechanism but rather as one shaped and supervised by state authority.

In the West, during the same period, the capitalist model was built upon a dynamic centered on transferring surplus production to markets, the continuous expansion of capital accumulation and the deepening of social stratification. For the Ottoman Empire, equality did not mean equality of opportunity in the Western sense but rather a distribution of welfare designed to maintain social balance. This approach protected the access of broad segments of society to basic needs while preventing the emergence of massive concentrations of wealth as seen in the West. In the Ottoman system, socioeconomic equality was secured not through market dynamics but through the regulatory capacity of the state and the social solidarity mechanisms provided by charitable foundations. While private property was protected, the unrestricted growth of wealth and the formation of alternative power centers were not permitted, reflecting a strategic choice aimed at maintaining social harmony and preserving state authority.

In contrast, Western civilization, particularly from the 16th century onward, followed a different path driven by the accelerating capitalist transformation. Capital accumulation, which formed the essence of the capitalist system, directed the primary purpose of production and trade toward profit maximization. While in the Ottoman Empire, the surplus of production was distributed in a balanced manner after basic needs were met, in the West, this surplus became the driving force behind the search for new markets and colonial expansion. Although this model initially stimulated economic dynamism, it also brought about a rupture that deepened social inequalities. In Europe, the development of capital accumulation, largely independent of state control, led to the emergence of new social classes. The growing influence of the commercial bourgeoisie initiated a process that challenged the aristocracy, transformed monarchies and ultimately redefined the very structure of the modern state.

These developments stood in stark contrast to the Ottoman fiscalist approach; although the Ottoman financial system aimed to maximize state revenues, it did so while maintaining a careful balance to protect social stability. In the West, the political power of capital gradually moved toward surpassing the authority of the state, whereas in the Ottoman Empire, the dominant role of the state in economic life was never undermined. At this point, the Ottoman Empire represented an economic paradigm that viewed the market not as an independent actor but as a domain subordinated to the needs of the state. The divergence was not limited to the instruments of economic policy but reflected a deeper separation rooted in societal value systems, the understanding of authority, and the very conception of equality.

The consequences of this divergence became increasingly visible from the 18th century onward. While the Ottoman Empire, aiming to secure the provision of essential goods, long facilitated imports, the West during the same period pursued policies supported by high tariff barriers designed to boost exports and protect local industries. The Ottoman approach, which sought to keep basic goods affordable and accessible, gradually weakened its competitive capacity against Western industrial production in the long run. Whereas the West developed an economic model that prioritized continuous capital accumulation and necessitated constant market expansion, the Ottoman Empire maintained a system that restricted production to align with societal needs during the same period.

The model developed by the West, however, carried within it the dilemmas of a civilization that imposed the cost of economic dynamism through growing social inequality. The advancement of capital accumulation independent of state control deepened the divide between social classes and gave rise to one of the most enduring problems of the modern era. With the Industrial Revolution, the sharp increase in production capacity drove down the cost of labor, leading to the expansion of the working class, while wealth became increasingly concentrated in the upper strata of society. During this period, European cities became sharply divided: on one side were the excessively wealthy owners of capital, and on the other, vast impoverished masses struggling to survive under harsh working and living conditions.

In contrast, Ottoman society developed mechanisms through foundations, guild organizations, and state interventions to prevent such deep social divides. The foundation-based structures of social solidarity in Ottoman cities not only met the basic needs of the poor but also supported social balance by facilitating access to education, health care and cultural life. Thus, the Ottoman conception of equality represented an approach that went beyond the discourse of individual rights derived from the liberal market dynamics of the West, placing social responsibility and public welfare at its core. This difference also explains the epistemic foundation of the conflicts that emerged between the Ottoman Empire and the West during the modernization process: while the West relied on a paradigm of constant progress and growth, the Ottoman Empire adhered to a cyclical understanding of history that prioritized social balance and sustainability.

Daniel Markovitz’s theory of the meritocracy trap directly points to the long-term consequences of this historical process. The technological transformation that accelerated with the Industrial Revolution initially boosted productivity but gradually began to erode the economic, social and cultural positions of the middle classes, continually shrinking their participation in the public sphere. According to Markovitz, in the early stages of capitalism, education functioned as a window of opportunity for social mobility; however, from the 1970s onward, the acceleration of automation and globalization dramatically reduced the value of low- and medium-skill jobs. During this period, high-skill jobs became an exclusive privilege accessible only to a narrow elite, and top-tier educational institutions evolved into tools that reinforced this elitist structure. As a result, social mobility weakened across Western societies, and class-based inequalities deepened significantly. At this point, the historical divergence between the Ottoman Empire and the West becomes strikingly evident. In the Ottoman social order, education and economic status were not as tightly connected. Individual advancement was shaped largely through the balanced functioning of guild organizations, charitable foundations, religious authorities and state bureaucracy, while social solidarity mechanisms kept social disparities within a more manageable scale.

One of the fundamental crises faced by Western societies today is that technological progress, instead of creating equality for the masses, has fostered a new caste system based on education and income. High-paying professions have become accessible only through educational institutions that require significant financial investment, while the middle classes are increasingly excluded from these opportunities. The Ottoman model, by prioritizing social balance over individual competition, offers an example of an alternative system capable of preventing such structural inequalities. Charitable foundations, a strong sense of collective responsibility, and the regulatory authority of the state together built a social structure that did not allow the deep divides produced by modern capitalism to emerge. For this reason, the Ottoman experience can be viewed as a kind of historical anti-thesis to the meritocracy trap defined by Markovitz.

In conclusion, the divergence between the Ottoman Empire and the West represents not merely an economic difference but a confrontation between two distinct civilizational visions. The Ottoman Empire established a system that placed the human being at its center, aiming to preserve social harmony and equality while preventing capital accumulation from becoming an independent force capable of shaping politics. The West, on the other hand, constructed a model focused on economic growth and technological progress, yet this process ultimately brought with it a structural crisis that deepened social inequalities. Although the Ottoman system struggled economically against the West in the long run, as Genç emphasizes, this period of resistance should not be viewed merely as a story of decline but also as an expression of the Ottoman Empire’s determination to preserve its own values.

The Ottoman Empire’s provision-centered economic system and its foundation-based mechanisms of social solidarity enabled not only economic equality but also the continuity of the civic sphere. As Genç points out, the civic sphere in the Ottoman context derived its vitality not solely from state authority but also from independent institutions that maintained social balance. Charitable foundations, guild organizations, madrassas, and the “hisba system” allowed different social actors to establish a horizontal balance of power based on a shared sense of collective responsibility. This approach not only distinguished the Ottoman Empire from the capital-driven social stratification of the West but also created fertile ground for the enrichment of social diversity and cultural production. In contrast, the capitalist mode of production in the West – alongside the dynamics that Markovitz characterizes as the meritocracy trap – placed capital accumulation at the center of the social power structure, confining education and employment opportunities to domains accessible only to a narrow elite. While the West gained strength through capital accumulation and industrialization, the Ottoman Empire sought to sustain a more balanced understanding of equality grounded in social solidarity, the provision system and the foundation-based public sphere. This contrast continues to resonate within today’s global economic order. As the West grapples with the inequalities and social fractures produced by its own model, the Ottoman experience offers an alternative perspective – one that emphasizes state responsibility, market regulation and the prioritization of social equilibrium.