Armenia’s election may become a turning point in the Caucasus

The parliamentary elections to be held in Armenia on June 7 cannot be read merely as a conventional change of government or a routine struggle for power. These elections represent the reflection at the ballot box of Armenia’s new geopolitical choice, shaped by its post-Soviet security dependency, its post-Karabakh identity crisis, the rupture in its strategic ties with Russia, its search for a Western-oriented foreign policy, and the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan. For this reason, the election in Yerevan has also turned into a regional moment of rupture closely monitored by Moscow, Baku, Ankara, Brussels, and Washington.

The central question of these elections is this: Will Armenia continue to remain within the Russia-centered security architecture, or will it seek to institutionalize the Western-oriented trajectory that began under Pashinyan?

In fact, the issue is not limited to a simple question of “Russia or the West.” At a deeper level, it brings to the forefront a much more fundamental debate: the reconstruction of Armenia’s state mind, its capacity to confront the new power geopolitics and realities that emerged in the region after the Second Karabakh War, and whether Armenia will position itself in the South Caucasus through peace or through a revisionist security discourse.

New state mindset through peace

The elections in Armenia are taking place at a time when the fragilities of the global system are becoming increasingly visible and deeper. In this context, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party represents Armenia’s adaptation to the post-Karabakh reality, the possibility of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the prospect of normalization with Türkiye, and the deepening of institutional relations with the West.

For Pashinyan, the election is not merely a struggle to preserve power, it also functions as a referendum on Armenia’s departure from its old security paradigm. Yet this is precisely Pashinyan’s weakest point. A segment of Armenian society sees him as politically responsible for the loss of Karabakh. For him, the Karabakh issue is both a heavy political burden and the starting point for the construction of a new reality. Instead of pursuing the rhetoric of “taking revenge for a lost war,” his discourse advocates transforming Armenia into a sovereign, viable, and outward-looking state within its existing borders.

This line is painful in terms of the historical memory of Armenian nationalism. However, it can be regarded as the most rational path in terms of regional peace. Therefore, Pashinyan’s victory would not mean that the peace process in the South Caucasus is fully guaranteed, but it would provide the strongest political ground for the continuation of that process.

However, there is a dual issue here: how will Armenia’s position and stance be shaped from this point onward?

Former President Robert Kocharyan, who leads the “Hayastan” Alliance, represents a line that favors closer strategic coordination with Russia, a harder security discourse, and a more maximalist approach to the Karabakh issue compared to Pashinyan. This line argues that Armenia’s security can be ensured not through the West, but by rebalancing its relations with Russia. Therefore, the Armenian elections will determine not only Pashinyan’s political future, but also the security mindset through which the country will act in the post-Karabakh period.

Anti-Pashinyan front

On one side stands Pashinyan’s line, which seeks to construct a new state mindset through peace, normalization and institutional rapprochement with the West. On the other side stands Kocharyan’s line, which places strategic coordination with Russia back at the center and interprets security through a harder, historically memory-driven perspective. For this reason, the outcome of the elections will directly affect not only Armenia’s domestic politics, but also the balance of power in the South Caucasus, the peace process with Azerbaijan, the possibility of normalization with Türkiye, and Russia’s regional influence capacity.

There are also other candidates. The line represented by Gagik Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia does not embody a sharply defined foreign policy vision in ideological terms. Rather, it represents a political space based on pragmatism, populism, and economic promises. Such actors often gain importance in Armenian politics through coalition balances. Although their capacity to alter the country’s geopolitical orientation on their own is limited, they may play a key role in the post-election parliamentary arithmetic.

Another important electoral actor is the Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. In addition to positioning himself within the anti-Pashinyan camp through the “Strong Armenia” alliance, Karapetyan derives his main political weight from the economic power he has accumulated in Russia, his capital networks, and his institutional connections within Armenia.

Based on these three figures, one of the most important issues that should be added is Russia’s influence over the elections. This is because Russia’s discomfort with Pashinyan has now moved beyond a merely implicit diplomatic unease. From Moscow’s perspective, Pashinyan is not only Armenia’s current prime minister; he is also a symbolic figure representing the weakening of Russia’s mechanisms of influence in the post-Soviet space.

Indeed, Yerevan now effectively regards the Collective Security Treaty Organization as dysfunctional, arguing that Russia has failed to guarantee Armenia’s security. It turns to actors such as France and India for defense procurement, deepens its relations with the European Union, and increases its strategic contacts with the United States. This picture indicates not merely a tactical search in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, but a more structural transformation in its security and identity framework.

For this reason, actors such as Kocharyan and Karapetyan should not be assessed merely as anti-Pashinyan political figures, but also as actors who could help Russia re-consolidate its sphere of influence in Armenia. While Kocharyan represents the old security elites and the idea of strategic coordination with Russia, Karapetyan brings to the agenda the possibility of a post-Pashinyan rebalancing through economic power, diaspora connections, and Russia-centred capital networks.

Meaning of election for region

First, there is the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process. The continuation of Pashinyan’s leadership could strengthen the possibility of signing a peace agreement. This would mean that the order in the South Caucasus, which has long been shaped by the logic of war and frozen conflict, could gradually give way to discussions on transportation routes, recognition of borders, and economic integration. However, a harder, more security-oriented anti-Pashinyan government might not completely halt the peace process, but it could slow it down and bring more maximalist demands to the negotiating text.

Second, there is the question of Türkiye-Armenia normalization. Pashinyan’s political line is more open to overcoming the closed border with Türkiye, historical mistrust, and the indirect form of relations conducted through third actors. This process is directly linked to the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace. The strengthening of a more Russia-oriented and Karabakh-centered security government in Yerevan could also make Ankara-Yerevan normalization more limited.

Finally, there is Russia’s role in the South Caucasus. While Russia has directed a significant part of its military and diplomatic capacity to the western front due to the war in Ukraine, it has been struggling to preserve its former determining role in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s turn toward the West, internal political tensions in Georgia, and Azerbaijan’s pursuit of a more autonomous regional policy mean, from Russia’s perspective, a transition from controlled influence to fragmented influence in the South Caucasus.

Therefore, for Moscow, the Armenian elections are not merely elections taking place in Yerevan, they are also a test of the limits of Russia’s retreat in the post-Soviet space. For this reason, the June 7 elections are not only about Armenia’s domestic politics, but also about the search for a new order in the South Caucasus.

If Pashinyan wins, peace and the Western-oriented trajectory may become more institutionalized. If the opposition gains strength, Russia’s regional influence may regain space. However, this would not automatically solve Armenia’s security problems. Today, Armenia’s fundamental issue is not only with whom it will build alliances, but also how it will manage a lost geopolitical reality. This election will answer the question of whether Armenia will cling to the past or, despite all its difficulties, accept the new regional reality and redefine itself accordingly. For the South Caucasus, this is the central issue.